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I. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND TRIANGULATION 
Lawrence Solum proposes that corpus linguistics—quantitative 
analysis of usage data from a broad body or corpus of contemporary 
texts1—might reveal which among possible meanings of an ambiguous 
term is most common and, thus, the most likely “ordinary” or 
 
*  Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. My thanks to Franita 
Tolson, Jay Kesten, and participants at the 2017 BYU Law Review Symposium, “Law & Corpus 
Linguistics,” and a faculty workshop at Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Alan 
LaCerra and Lauren Pettine for excellent research assistance. Responsibility for unliquidated 
ambiguities, nonce formations, and failures of clarity is mine alone to bear. 
 1.  Stephen C. Mouritsen, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a 
Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1938. 
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“conventional semantic meaning” of a term.2  Such evidence of 
contemporary usage might fruitfully contribute to a search for original 
meaning of constitutional language.3 Professor Solum argues that the 
search for original meaning should be undertaken by triangulating 
corpus evidence with two other methods for discovering original 
meaning: immersive reading of texts contemporary with the drafting 
of the Constitution; and careful examination of the drafting, 
ratification, and implementation history of the Constitution.4 
Consilience, or agreement, between these methods would strongly 
indicate a dominant meaning of a given term.5 But proper 
triangulation could be a massive undertaking. As Professor Solum 
notes, locating the original meaning of constitutional language may 
well amount to a work of many lifetimes, requiring “a division of 
intellectual labor.”6 Nonetheless, digitization and computational 
analysis of a large number of texts created prior to, and 
contemporaneous with, the drafting of the Constitution might better 
provide information about ordinary meaning for which courts 
currently consult dictionaries.7 
This response agrees in large part with Professor Solum’s 
prescription and focuses on how to best use corpus lexicography to 
confirm or refute other evidence of original public meaning.8 The 
tools to build and digitally examine corpora are relatively new, but 
corpus lexicography can fruitfully build on both analysis grounded in 
immersion and constitutional history analysis carried out in earlier 
scholarship.9 Herein I focus on how corpus lexicography might build 
 
 2.  Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, 
Immersion,  and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1631 [hereinafter 
Solum,  Triangulating]. 
 3.  Id. at 1623–25. 
 4.  Id.  
 5.  Id. at 1676–77. 
 6.  Id. at 1680. 
 7.  See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 8.  Linguistics is “[t]he scientific study of language and its structure,” Linguistics, 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2017), http://www.oed.com., while lexicography is the art of 
compiling a dictionary, Lexicography, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2017), http://www.oed 
.com. Both disciplines entail a search for ordinary and unusual meanings of words as lexical units. 
In this response, I adopt the term corpus lexicography for the use of data analysis to uncover 
usual meanings, consistent with Professor Solum’s use in his essay. 
 9.  See infra Sections III.III.A–III.B. 
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on prior scholarly work which analyzes the language of Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution (“the Copyright and Patent 
Clause”). That provision empowers Congress to secure for limited 
times to authors and inventors exclusive rights in copyrighted 
expression and patented inventions.10 Intellectual property scholars 
mining contemporaneous texts and constitutional history have done 
important work defining key terms, but they reach conflicting 
conclusions.11 Corpus lexicography may be well suited to support or 
refute “traditional” linguistic analysis because it quantifies analysis that 
has historically been left to the interpretive faculties of the reader, 
scholar, or jurist.12 
This response will also alert the reader to potential pitfalls to avoid 
when undertaking corpus lexicography.13 For instance, Professor 
Solum notes that corpus lexicography might often fail to recognize an 
attempt to use an existing word in a new way to create meaning. By 
definition, a use that diverges from standard meanings will be difficult 
to track using any measure designed to detect standard meanings. 
Such a modulation might not be picked up by texts contemporaneous 
with the drafting of the Constitution precisely because the use is new. 
This is problematic if the drafters intended to use an existing word in 
a new way. Context might reveal this new intended meaning, but 
Professor Solum expresses reasonable concern that corpus analysis will 
miss it. This response highlights one potential approach to corpus 
construction that might ameliorate this limitation by treating the 
drafting and ratification of the Constitution as an inflection point 
from  which we might measure semantic shift—the creation of 
new meaning.14 
 
 10.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). 
 11.  See infra Sections III.III.C–III.D. 
 12.  Cf. Beth Levin, Grace Song & B. T. S. Atkins, Making Sense of Corpus Data: A Case 
Study of Verbs of Sound, 2 INT’L. J. CORPUS LING. 23, 29–30 (1997). 
 13.  See infra Part V. 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
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II. ORIGINALISM AND SEMANTIC SHIFT 
Originalism is, with some variance between subdisciplines, a search 
for constitutional meaning contemporaneous with the founding era. 
Professor Solum in particular begins with the premise that proper 
originalist analysis of constitutional text should strive to define the 
“original public meaning” of constitutional terms. In other words, the 
text of the Constitution should be interpreted consistent with how the 
text would have been understood by the public at the time it was 
drafted.15 Originalist interpretation has certainly captured the 
imagination of scholars and judges. The originalist approach is 
nonetheless susceptible to the accusation that it lacks discipline. To a 
skeptic, an originalist inquiry might resemble Justice Scalia’s famous 
criticism of reliance on legislative history:16 Originalist scholars might 
naturally look out over an ambiguous historical record and focus on 
evidence consistent with their expectations.17 
The inquiry into original meaning is often conducted with 
dictionaries. Dictionaries may have been the best available interpretive 
tool in earlier eras, but they are not necessarily a good tool. Many 
dictionaries are organized with goals distinct from or even antithetical 
to a search for original public meaning.18 None seem systematic in 
 
 15.  See Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1629, 1637; see also Randy E. Barnett & 
Evan Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism 3–5 (Oct. 5, 2017) 
(unpublished article), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3049056. 
 16.  Justice Scalia commonly used an analogy first announced by Judge Leventhal. See, 
e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1310 n.58 (1990). 
 17. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not 
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1303–07, 1312–14 (1998); 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory 
Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 457 (1994) (“The main danger in judicial 
interpretation of the Constitution—or, for that matter, in judicial interpretation of any law—is 
that the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law.” (quoting Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 856 (1989))); Vasan Kesavan & Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 1113, 1138 (2003) (noting that a search for “the actual understanding of the Ratifiers” 
does not avoid “all the problems of use of legislative history and ascertaining collective 
intention”); Cass R. Sunstein, Originalism 3–4 (Oct. 17, 2017) (online working paper), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=3055093. 
 18.  See Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 
1561, 1614–16 (1994); Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1935–37, 1945–46 (arguing that at best, 
using traditional techniques, a dictionary can provide “the most frequently encountered 
meaning,” not “the most frequently occurring meaning”); Malla Pollack, What is Congress 
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offering a most common meaning. Indeed, some dictionaries suggest 
meanings that are archaic or effectively abandoned. One cannot safely 
assume lexicographers compiled a given dictionary with the goal of 
revealing original public meaning, and dictionaries may thus be a tool 
that is not well-suited to the originalism often attempted with their 
assistance.19 Corpus lexicography thus holds out the promise that data 
of usage derived from the right corpora might “make originalism’s 
methodology more rigorous.”20 
To understand the importance of the originalism movement in 
constitutional interpretation, one must understand how the meaning 
of a word can change over time. As Professor Solum notes, “[w]ords 
and phrases have conventional semantic meanings, determined by 
patterns of usage.”21 Not every attempted linguistic change catches 
on. Indeed, one can trace obscure blips or “nonce formations” that 
are proposed and never adopted.22 Other usages can be adopted by 
local communities in certain contexts.23 Some of these occasional 
meanings become “usual” or ordinary, and the word thus adopts that 
 
Supposed to Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States 
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 789 (2001) [hereinafter 
Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?]; Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1631 
(“Words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings, determined by patterns of usage. 
Lexicographers report these conventional semantic meanings in dictionary definitions, but such 
definitions are secondary evidence of the patterns of usage.”). 
 19. Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1641. On occasion, the Court clearly 
recognizes that a statutory provision has incorporated a meaning that is not the most common 
meaning, but is revealed through context. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 
U.S. 581, 594–98 (2004) (rejecting the argument that “age” as used in the ADEA must have 
the same meaning in every instance, and using context to determine which meaning was 
probably intended). 
 20.  Lee J. Strang, The Original Meaning of ‘Religion’ in the First Amendment: A Test 
Case for Originalism’s Utilization of Corpus Linguistics 1, 1 (Sept. 1, 2017) (unpublished 
paper); accord Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 
535 (2003) (“Madison believed in the inevitability of linguistic change, [but] did not think that 
this change should affect the meaning of laws or constitutions.”). 
 21.  Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1631. 
 22.  See Jake Linford, A Linguistic Justification for Protecting “Generic” Trademarks, 17 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 110, 131 (2015) [hereinafter Linford, “Generic” Trademarks]. One recent 
example of an attempted modulation on film was featured in the movie Mean Girls. The effort 
of one character to use “fetch” as a synonym for “cool” or “awesome” is blocked by a friend 
with a frosty “Stop trying to make ‘fetch’ happen. It’s not going to happen.” See Jake Linford, 
The False Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1367, 
1411 (2015) [hereinafter Linford, False Dichotomy] (quoting MEAN GIRLS (Paramount 
Pictures 2004)). 
 23.  See supra note 22.   
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meaning irrespective of context.24 When you ask someone what a given 
word means, the answer is likely one of a handful of publicly accessible, 
relatively well-established and thus acontextual meanings. 
As English speakers, it is easy to assume that we use words much 
the same way those words were used centuries ago, but as many high 
school students learn when they first encounter Shakespeare, that 
assumption is often incorrect. Likewise, an appeal to modern meaning 
might lead to fundamental error in constitutional interpretation.25 A 
contemporary reader of English is likely to presume key terms in the 
Constitution have meanings consistent with one or more common 
contemporary meanings. In reality, words often experience semantic 
shift over time.26 Meanings broaden or narrow; offensive meanings are 
ameliorated and inoffensive meanings become pejorative; and words 
add new meanings either by adding close meanings, or by shifting 
away from traditional meanings when similar foreign words conflict.27 
Words used in the Constitution often undergo semantic shift between 
the founding era and the modern era. Failure to account for the shift 
can lead to interpretive error, but corpus lexicography can reveal 
those differences. 
At its core, corpus lexicography is interpretation through data 
analysis. The term corpus refers to a dataset of words, culled from 
numerous texts. There are two standard types of analysis. First, 
statistical analysis can show the key word in context (KWIC). Each use 
of the word will appear in a sentence or other string of characters, and 
a reader can consider each use as it appears in the original text. If the 
number of occurrences is unwieldy, a randomly determined sample of 
those instances could be reviewed instead. 
Corpus analysis also can provide evidence of collocation. 
Collocation is “the habitual juxtaposition or association” of a given 
word with other words at a frequency higher than chance.28 A search 
 
 24.  For a more detailed discussion of modulation and semantic shift, see Linford, 
“Generic” Trademarks, supra note 22, at 130–45; Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 22, 
at 1391–98. 
 25.  See, e.g., Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1645–46. 
 26.  Id. at 1639–41. 
 27.  See Linford, “Generic” Trademarks, supra note 22, at 132–33. 
 28.  Collocation, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
definition/collocation (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). 
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for collocates will display how often a given word appears within a 
certain distance of the target word.29 Collocation thus provides 
information about words that are often fellow travelers. Evidence of 
collocation can highlight the context of usage. Understanding which 
words frequently appear near the target word can thus indicate 
ordinary usage of the target word.30 Collocation evidence may also 
allow a researcher to track semantic shift over time.31 
Professor Solum provides an example of semantic shift in the 
Copyright and Patent Clause. The clause empowers Congress “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”32 Our modern 
understanding of the term science would lead the reader to conclude 
that Congress is empowered to promote progress in “hard sciences”—
chemistry, physics, and the like—through the grant of copyright and 
patent protection.33 This presumption is incorrect, and corpus 
lexicography can reveal the difference between founding era and 
modern usage. Professor Solum’s article summarizes evidence from 
one corpus, the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), 
which includes texts as old as 1810. Professor Solum’s search reveals 
that most of the collocates for science of are not references to STEM 
sciences but to a broader collection of knowledge bases, including 
“government, politics, art, law, religion, and theology.”34 Indeed, 
consistent with established precedent, copyright protection does not 
extend to scientific invention but instead protects creative 
expression—the authors’ “writings.”35 Our modern understanding of 
science does not fit how the term is understood as part of the 
Constitution’s grant of power to Congress. This change between 
 
 29.  Mouritsen, supra note 1, at 1958, 1963. 
 30.  Collocation evidence can be adjusted to control for the frequency of each word’s 
appearance in the corpus generally, to avoid overreporting the frequency of collocation with 
common words or underreporting collocation with rare ones. 
 31.  See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text. 
 32.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 33.  Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1640 (“The contemporary meaning of the 
word is usually limited to the so-called hard sciences such as physics, chemistry, 
and  biology . . . .”). 
 34.  Id. at 1646. 
 35.  Jake Linford, The Institutional Progress Clause, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 533, 
559 (2014) (citing Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 887–88 (2012)). 
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founding era and contemporary definitions of science is an example of 
semantic shift.36 
Other terms in the Copyright and Patent Clause present similar 
interpretive challenges. For example, several scholars have engaged in 
a close reading of texts contemporaneous with the Constitution in an 
attempt to define a meaning for progress as it is used in the Copyright 
and Patent Clause.37 Other articles examine the limited history of the 
ratification debates over the clause to discover similar information.38 
The next part discusses this evidence and highlights a few conflicts of 
interpretation and construction that this research has revealed. 
III. COMPETING DEFINITIONS OF PROGRESS 
Prior attempts to pin down the meaning of key terms in the 
Copyright and Patent Clause have frequently relied on immersion or 
an examination of constitutional history. But scholars pursuing these 
methods of inquiry have reached conflicting conclusions about the 
proper interpretation of key terms and the proper legal construction 
of those terms. For instance, scholars reach different conclusions 
about the proper meaning of progress as used in the Copyright and 
Patent Clause.39 
These conflicting interpretations might be resolved if corpus 
linguistic evidence of public meaning favors one meaning. Thus, 
assuming that original public meaning should set the bounds of 
judicial construction, properly defining progress is therefore crucially 
important.40 One fundamental debate concerns whether the stated 
goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and useful Arts”41 grants 
broad power to Congress to implement copyright and patent 
protection as it sees fit, or limits Congress to enacting grants 
 
 36.  Other scholars refer to these phenomena as semantic change, semantic progression, 
or semantic drift. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT & RICHARD B. DASHER, REGULARITY 
IN SEMANTIC CHANGE 1 (2002) (defining semantic change as a shift “from one linguistically 
coded meaning to another”). 
 37.  See infra Section III.III.A. 
 38.  See infra Section III.III.B. 
 39.  See infra Section III.C. 
 40.  Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent 
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 145 (1993) (“[W]e cannot decide how to ‘promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts’ before we have debated the terms of progress.”). 
 41.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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consistent with a narrow definition of progress.42 One cannot answer 
that question without defining progress. But once we understand the 
nature of the progress that Congress is empowered to promote, we 
can properly evaluate claims that the copyright and patent regimes are 
overbroad or underprotective in whole or in part.43 
A. Immersion 
Many scholars turn to historical accounts to trace common 
meanings of progress. The majority of these historical accounts indicate 
that progress was a relatively modern idea in the “seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries,”44 although other scholars suggest that a fairly 
contemporary concept of progress was captured or expressed by 
classical authors.45 Some legal scholars investigate the work of one or 
two authors, and others examine multiple volumes.46 This may be 
 
 42.  Compare Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (suggesting 
that Congress’s patent power is limited to promoting progress in the useful arts), with Golan v. 
Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 326 (2012) (reading broadly Congress’s power to promote progress by 
extending copyright protection to works that have lost copyright protection for deficiencies like 
failing to observe certain formalities). 
 43.  See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1001–02 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J., dissenting), 
aff’d but criticized sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“[P]atentable processes 
must ‘be in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to 
promote the progress of ‘useful arts.’ Business method patents do not promote the ‘useful arts’ 
because they are not directed to any technological or scientific innovation.” (emphasis omitted) 
(citation omitted)). 
 44.  Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 3, 8 (2001) (first citing JOHN BAGNELL BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS: AN INQUIRY INTO 
ITS ORIGIN AND GROWTH 7 (1932); and then citing DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE SEEKERS: THE 
STORY OF MAN’S CONTINUING QUEST TO UNDERSTAND HIS WORLD 184 (1998)); see also 
Chon, supra note 40, at 116 (first citing HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA 
(1976); and then citing RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND 
SOCIETY 205–06 (1976)). 
 45.  Birnhack, supra note 44, at 7 (citing ROBERT NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS, at xii (1994)). 
 46.  Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?, supra note 18, at 803–09 (first citing 
A. R. J. Turgot, Turgot, A Philosophical Review of the Successive Advances of the Human Mind, in 
TURGOT ON PROGRESS, SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS 41, 41–44 (Ronald L. Meek ed. & 
trans., 1973); then citing ANTOINE-NICOLAS DE CONDORCET, SKETCH FOR A HISTORICAL 
PICTURE OF THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND 33, 38, 42, 73–76, 92–93, 99–106, 117–
20, 136–40, 164, 171, 186–88 (June Barraclough trans., Noonday Press 1955) (1795); then 
citing THE MARQUIS OF CONDORCET, THE FRENCH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE LIFE OF M. 
TURGOT, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE FINANCES OF FRANCE IN THE YEARS 1774, 1775, 
and 1776 (1787); then citing Michael Kiernan, Preface to FRANCIS BACON, THE ADVANCEMENT 
OF KNOWLEDGE, at vii, vii (Michael Kiernan ed., Clarendon Press 2000); then citing FRANCIS 
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second-order immersion, relying on historians to define progress. Legal 
scholars can then use the interpretation provided to motivate a proper 
construction. Of course, a historical exegesis of the usage of progress 
may or may not precisely dovetail with the common meaning of 
the term. 
Two scholarly attempts at immersion look somewhat like proto-
corpus lexicography. Malla Pollack analyzed every usage of the word 
progress in the Pennsylvania Gazette,47 a newspaper often touted as the 
paper of record for the founding era.48 Professor Pollack identified five 
definitions of progress as used in the Pennsylvania Gazette, as well as 
quotations of the Copyright and Patent Clause, ordered in the 
footnote below from most to least frequently used.49 She concluded 
 
BACON, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 9 (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2000) (1605); then 
citing MERIC CASAUBON, A TREATISE CONCERNING ENTHUSIASM (1655); then citing 
Lawrence E. Klein, Introduction to SHAFTESBURY, CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN, MANNERS, 
OPINIONS, TIMES, at vii, passim (Lawrence E. Klein ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999); then 
citing 2 BERNARD MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR, PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK 
BENEFITS 43 (Clarendon Press 1924) (1714); then citing F. B. Kaye, Introduction to BERNARD 
MANDEVILLE, THE FABLE OF THE BEES: OR PRIVATE VICES, PUBLICK BENEFITS, at xvii, xxxix, 
lx–lxi (Liberty Fund 1988) (1732); then citing BERNARD MANDEVILLE, A LETTER TO DION 40 
(Bonamy Dobree ed., Univ. Press of Liverpool 1954) (1732); then citing David Berman, 
Introduction to GEORGE BERKELEY, ALCIPHRON OR THE MINUTE PHILOSOPHER IN FOCUS 1, 
1–2 (David Berman ed., 1993) (1732); then citing GEORGE BERKELEY, ALCIPHRON, OR THE 
MINUTE PHILOSOPHER IN FOCUS 6, 12, 24, 29, 52, 158 (David Berman ed., 1993) (1732); 
then citing FRANCIS HUTCHINSON, REFLECTIONS UPON LAUGHTER AND REMARKS UPON THE 
FABLE OF THE BEES (Garland Publ’g 1971) (1750); then citing FRANCIS HUTCHINSON, AN 
INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINAL OF OUR IDEAS OF BEAUTY AND VIRTUE (Garland Publ’g 1971) 
(2d ed. 1726); then citing FRANCIS HUTCHESON, ON HUMAN NATURE (Thomas Mautner ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 1993) (containing both “Reflections on Our Common Systems of 
Morality,” and “On the Social Nature of Man”); then citing ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF 
MORAL SENTIMENTS 236 (Liberty Classics 1982) (1759); and then citing ADAM SMITH, THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Modern Library 2000) (1776)). 
 47.  Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?, supra note 18, at 798 (“I consider 
the word usage of the Pennsylvania Gazette the best currently available evidence of what 1789 
American residents would have understood from the word ‘progress’ in the Progress Clause.”); 
cf. Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. 
REV. 847, 856–66 (2003) (using the Pennsylvania Gazette to explicate meaning of “commerce” 
and “to regulate”). 
 48.  Charles E. Clark & Charles Wetherell, The Measure of Maturity: The Penn-
sylvania Gazette, 1728-1765, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 279, 280 (1989) (arguing that the 
Pennsylvania Gazette “[i]n its essential character, although not in its unusual longevity, . . . was 
representative of the great majority of the newspapers of the provincial period”). 
 49.  Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?, supra note 18, at 798: 
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ratification to define key terms or set the bounds of congressional 
authority.55 Indeed, the Supreme Court has never defined progress.56 
Scholars attempting to flesh out the meaning of progress have 
turned to drafts of proposed language that were not accepted to 
provide some insight. For example, Dotan Oliar examined draft 
language proposed by both James Madison and Charles Pinckney, and 
suggests that differences between those proposed clauses and the 
Clause as adopted assist in interpreting progress. For example, the 
language of draft clauses proposed by both Madison and Pinckney 
would have extended plenary power to Congress to grant patent and 
copyright protection. Neither proposal included language like the 
Progress phrase that was eventually adopted.57 The decision to reject 
these broader grants of power and adopt instead the Clause as enacted 
tends, as Professor Oliar reads it, “to prove that the Progress 
[language] was added as a limitation.”58 
Due to the paucity of evidence from the drafting and ratification 
debates, scholars often rely on post-ratification activity by Congress 
and the courts to echolocate meanings of constitutional terms.59 To 
wit, scholars have found meaningful congressional inactivity in 
defining the contours of progress. For instance, Congress chose not to 
act in response to President Washington’s call to found a national 
university,60 and likewise failed to pass legislation that would have 
provided direct subsidies for scientific research and exploration.61 
 
 55.  Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright 
Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307, 317 (2005). 
 56.  Christina Mulligan et al., Founding-Era Translations of the U.S. Constitution, 31 
CONST. COMMENT. 1, 27 (2016). 
 57.  Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as 
a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1776 (2006). 
 58.  Id. at 1777. 
 59.  See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History & Theory, 
63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 65–66 (2011) (arguing that early limitations on patented inventions 
imposed by a Patent Board created by Congress in 1790 reflected an intent to restrict patent 
protection to inventions that promoted the progress of science and useful arts). 
 60. Walterscheid, Preambular Argument, supra note 54, at 348 (citing 13 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 1221 
(Helen E. Veit et. al eds., 1994)). 
 61.  Id. at 348–49 (citing American State Papers, Miscellaneous, Doc. No. 74, 4th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1796); Annals of Congress, Feb. 3, 1796, at 288; A. HUNTER DUPREE, SCIENCE IN 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A HISTORY OF POLICIES AND ACTIVITIES TO 1940, at 
14 (1957)). 
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These instances of inaction suggest Congress interpreted narrowly its 
authority to encourage progress through means other than the grant 
of copyright or patent protection.62 
Professor Solum suggests that evidence of congressional inactivity 
may underdetermine original meaning. Interpreting the Constitution 
in light of early congressional action (or inaction) or judicial decisions 
might too easily reflect the political agendas or subconscious biases of 
legislators or judges, leading to interpretations inconsistent with the 
meaning the public might make from the language chosen.63 But 
reliance on post-ratification (in)activity may well meet the 
expectations of at least some founders. For example, James Madison 
seems to have expected that some ambiguity would be resolved, 
liquidated, or made plain post-ratification in precisely this manner.64 
Evidence of post-ratification (in)activity would be particularly 
important for provisions for which there is little or no record of debate 
or discussion. 
Indeed, such evidence has been persuasive in two recent Supreme 
Court cases considering the proper scope of congressional authority 
to extend copyright protection. In both Eldred v. Ashcroft and Golan 
v. Holder, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress had frequently 
exercised broad constitutional power to expand copyright protection, 
 
 62. Walterscheid, Preambular Argument, supra note 54, at 348. 
 63.  Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1659–60; see also Craig W. Dallon, Original 
Intent and the Copyright Clause: Eldred v. Ashcroft Gets It Right, 50 ST. LOUIS L.J. 307, 357 
(2006) (“Longevity of a practice alone, particularly where a constitutional challenge had never 
before been considered, should not define the reach of the Constitution. Interpreting the 
meaning of the Constitution based on the conduct of Congress undermines judicial review and 
diminishes the force of the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)); L. Ray Patterson, What’s Wrong 
with Eldred? An Essay on Copyright Jurisprudence, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 345, 349 (2003) 
(criticizing the Court’s use of congressional practice to determine the original meaning instead 
of using the Constitution to evaluate congressional practice). Consider, however, circumstances 
in which Justice Scalia, an ardent originalist, turns to early post-ratification practice to locate 
original meaning. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 129, 
145–46 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998) (“[I]t is entirely clear that capital punishment, which was 
widely in use in 1791, does not violate the abstract moral principle of the Eighth Amendment.”); 
Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 296 (2009). 
 64.  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. 
L. REV. 1, 13 (2001); Paul G. Ream, Note, Liquidation of Constitutional Meaning Through Use, 
66 DUKE L.J. 1645 (2017); Will Baude, Some Cold Water on the Liquidation Debate, WASH. 
POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/04/14/some-cold-water-on-the-liquidation-debate/?utm_ter 
m=.85fb61af0b47. 
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and construed the Copyright and Patent Clause accordingly.65 
Originalists must consider the possibility that in some cases early 
congressional (in)activity and judicial interpretation provide evidence 
of meaning that may well trump other indicators,66 even if the 
interpretation driven by that evidence is not in consilience with corpus 
lexicography, immersion, or other evidence of constitutional history.67 
C. Meaning(s) of Progress 
Prior scholarship has sought to interpret progress using immersion 
and historical methods, but to date, those analyses have not decided 
the question. Ambiguities remain unresolved. In areas like these, 
corpus lexicography might serve as a tie-breaker, or at least a thumb 
on the scale in favor of one meaning or another. 
As Professor Solum notes, some originalists distinguish between 
interpretation and construction of constitutional language.68 
Interpretation “discovers the communicative content of the 
constitutional text.”69 Construction “determines the legal effect of the 
constitutional text, including the decision of constitutional cases and 
the legal content of constitutional doctrines.”70 Professor Solum’s 
article in this volume focuses on interpretation instead of 
 
 65.  Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 320 (2012) (holding that Congress could 
constitutionally re-extend copyright protection to works in the public domain, and finding such 
a grant consistent with the Copyright Act of 1790, enacted by the First Congress); Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (granting a twenty-year increase in the term of copyright 
protection to both existing and future works was consistent with the decision in the Copyright 
Act of 1790 to grant a fourteen-year renewal term to both existing and future works). But see, 
e.g., id. at 228 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Because the content of that first legislation, the debate 
that accompanied it, and the differences between the initial versions and the bills that ultimately 
passed provide strong evidence of early Congresses’ understanding of the constitutional limits 
of the Copyright/Patent Clause, I examine both the initial copyright and patent statutes.”); id. 
at 230, 237. 
 66.  Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897) 
(“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things 
he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court;—and so of a legal right.”). 
 67.  On the dangers of appeals to the historical record in legal scholarship more generally, 
see Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and 
Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 996–97 (2006) (critiquing the use of “incomplete 
historical claims” to argue for a recent “propertization” of copyright that in truth is hard to 
distinguish from eighteenth-century conceptions of copyright). 
 68.  Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1628. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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construction. But interpretation and construction are intimately 
intertwined. Indeed, scholars who have sought original meaning 
through immersion or constitutional history reach competing 
interpretations of progress, and those interpretations drive competing 
constructions of the proper scope of legislative authority to 
provide  copyright and patent protection and judicial review of 
those enactments.71 
1. Interpretation 
As discussed above, scholars like Professor Pollack, then-Professor 
Lee, and Senator Hatch conclude, using datamining techniques from 
a limited corpus, that the most common meaning of progress is likely 
spread, dissemination, or distribution.72 Despite the evidence amassed, 
the “spread” definition has not been embraced by the majority of 
scholars.73 Instead, most scholars have embraced a series of meanings 
that coalesce around the notion that progress means advancement in 
knowledge,74 using phrases like “the encouragement of learning”75 to 
refine the concept. Advancement can then be measured either in 
 
 71.  Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?, supra note 18, at 804 (“The Idea 
of Progress, of course, allows the word ‘progress’ to accumulate [ ] disparate meanings . . . .”); 
see also Malla Pollack, The Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the Modern First Amendment 
and the Original Progress Clause (a.k.a. Copyright and Patent Clause), 45 JURIMETRICS 23, 25, 
26, 28 (2004); Malla Pollack, Dampening the Illegitimacy of the United States’ Government: 
Reframing the Constitution from Contract to Promise, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 123, 206 (2005). 
 72.  See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text. 
 73.  See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 
61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1373–74 (2012) (critiquing and ultimately rejecting Pollack’s analysis). 
 74.  Ned Snow, Discrimination in the Copyright Clause, 67 ALA. L. REV. 583, 594 (2016) 
(summarizing examples of “advances in knowledge” interpretations). 
 75.  EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 150–51 (2002); L. Ray Patterson & Craig 
Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ View of the Copyright Power Granted 
to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 
938 (2003). 
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quantitative increase76 or qualitative improvement.77 This 
advancement definition relies in part on founding era assumptions 
about the inevitability of progress.78 
Support for both the advancement and spread meanings can be 
unearthed in founding era dictionaries. Several dictionaries published 
close in time to the ratification of the Constitution include an 
advancement definition. For example, the 1785 edition of Samuel 
Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language offers, among its 
definitions, the following meaning of progress: “Intellectual 
improvement; advancement in knowledge; proficience.”79 Noah 
Webster’s 1828 edition of his American Dictionary of the English 
Language provides a definition that is essentially identical.80 But these 
same dictionaries also offer definitions consistent with the spread 
meaning. For example, the first listed definition of progress in 
Webster’s 1828 dictionary indicates that progress can be “a moving or 
going forward; a proceeding onward.”81 
Another group of scholars critique the presumptions undergirding 
a classic interpretation of progress. Advances in scientific knowledge or 
the technology we use to disseminate information do not guarantee a 
“state of ‘betterment’ for others.”82 These “postmodern” analyses 
instead conclude progress is best understood to indicate advancement 
 
 76.  See, e.g., Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The 
Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 
1173; L. Ray Patterson, Eldred v. Reno: An Example of the Law of Unintended Consequences, 8 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 223, 234 (2001) (“[T]he creation of a new work is the unalterable condition 
for copyright, a condition that the Framers . . . made a part of the Copyright Clause” by 
authorizing Congress to “promote the Progress of Science.”). 
 77.  Fromer, supra note 73, at 1373 (“‘To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts’ generally refers to the goal of encouraging the advancement of systematic knowledge, 
cultural knowledge, and technology. . . . [This] understanding can further mean improvement 
in a knowledge base’s quality or quantity.”). 
 78.  Birnhack, supra note 44, at 19–20; Chon, supra note 40, at 117. 
 79.  2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785).  
 80.  2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(Johnson Reprint Corp. 1970) (1828) (progress defined as “advance in knowledge; intellectual 
or moral improvement; proficiency”). 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Jessica Silbey, Promoting Progress: A Qualitative Analysis of Creative and Innovative 
Production, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 515, 519 (Matthew David 
& Debora Halbert eds. 2014). 
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of civilization collectively or the improved condition of humankind,83 
through responsible stewardship and distributional fairness.84 
2. Construction 
These competing interpretations of progress can lead to differing 
constructions of congressional power and the proper scope of judicial 
review. Some scholars conclude that the progress language is primarily 
an open conveyance of power. For instance, Craig Dallon concludes 
that the Copyright and Patent Clause should be “understood broadly 
to empower Congress to make changes to copyright law that it 
rationally believes improve the overall copyright scheme.”85 Robert 
Merges similarly concludes that “[g]iven a constitutional provision 
rooted in a blind faith in ‘progress,’ we cannot read in historically 
contingent limitations on patentable subject matter.”86 Others 
conclude that the progress language conveys only limited power to 
Congress, and thus limits Congress’s authority to extend protection 
to copyrighted expression or patented inventions. For example, 
Professor Oliar concludes after his intensive study of drafts from the 
framing era that “[t]he Framers intended the progress language in the 
Clause—‘to promote the progress of science and useful art’—to limit 
Congress’s power to grant IP rights.”87 
Those scholars who see the Progress phrase as a limit also differ as 
to how the phrase cabins congressional authority. For example, Paul 
 
 83.  Similar language is found in several state copyright statutes from the Confederation 
period. See, e.g., Dallon, supra note 63, at 325 n.131 (quoting COPYRIGHT ENACTMENTS: LAWS 
PASSED IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1783 RELATING TO COPYRIGHT 4, 8–9 (Copyright 
Office ed., Bulletin No. 3 rev. 1963)) (“The Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island 
copyright acts made reference to the need to encourage ‘the progress of civilization.’”). The 
Constitution embeds two notions of progress: intellectual progress, or progress regarding 
knowledge, and social and political organization (a better frame for copyright law), and material 
progress, for example, progress in technology and natural sciences (a better frame for patent 
law)). See Birnhack, supra note 44, at 16–17.  
 84.  See, e.g., Chon, supra note 40, at 101–02. 
 85.  Dallon, supra note 63, at 357; see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[B] (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 1963), Lexis (arguing that the 
introductory phrase has expanded, rather than limited, Congress’s authority). 
 86.  Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights 
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 587 (1999). 
 87.  Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New Reading, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 421, 423 (2009). 
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Heald and Suzanna Sherry argue this limitation must be 
operationalized by requiring an express quid pro quo from authors 
and inventors before Congress can grant an exclusive right.88 A parallel 
argument is marshaled by several scholars in support of subject matter 
limitations on patentable inventions.89 Senator Hatch and Professor 
Lee instead conclude that a grant is constitutionally permissible, 
following the spread meaning, if it does no more than encourage the 
dissemination of already created works.90 Interestingly, (and perhaps 
troublingly for Professor Solum’s anticipated consilience), Professor 
Pollack likewise concludes spread is the most common meaning of 
progress but nevertheless construes the Copyright and Patent Clause 
to bar new grants that do not tie protection to the creation of 
new works.91 
Similarly, some scholars have argued that progress requires an 
increase in the quality of copyrighted expression and patented 
inventions. Professor Oliar suggests this limit should require courts to 
consider whether new legislative grants of rights to copyright or patent 
owners provide benefits greater than the costs imposed.92 But Barton 
 
 88.  Heald & Sherry, supra note 76, at 1162 (“[A]n author or inventor may not be given 
something for nothing; the author or the inventor must give the public something it did not 
have before to earn a grant of exclusive rights from Congress.”). 
 89.  See, e.g., Brief of Eleven Law Professors and AARP as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 33, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (No. 08-964) (citing Suzanne 
Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991)) (discussing the effects of patents on sequential innovation). 
 90.  Hatch & Lee, supra note 51, at 16–20. 
 91.  Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?, supra note 18, at 761 (“If a court 
thoughtfully considers ‘progress’ (under any definition), the CTEA should be held 
unconstitutional in all its applications. The Eldred court merely invoked the alleged upside of 
the change without considering the downside—an improper way to do any type of cost/benefit 
analysis.”); see also id. at 763 (“[T]he CTEA only claims to promote ‘progress,’ if ‘progress’ 
means ‘economic value.’ . . . [But giving] copyright holders more of the financial value of the 
work . . . [or] supporting a strong export industry . . . [does not] conceivably promote 
‘progress’ if that word means either ‘quality improvement’ or ‘spread.’”). 
 92. Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause, supra note 57, at 1789–1807, 
1840–41 (arguing that progress is consistent with “advancement” or promotion, and that courts 
should declare unconstitutional those statutory enactments that impose costs greater than their 
marginal benefits); Hatch & Lee, supra note 51, at 3 (“‘[P]rogress . . . encompass[es] . . . an 
increase in quantity or quality of works . . . .”); cf. Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent 
Reform  and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 2 (2007) (“Technology 
heavyweights . . . fear that, rather than encouraging the ‘progress of science and the useful arts’ 
as required by the United States Constitution, declining patent quality and overly broad patent 
rights are reducing incentives to invest in manufacturing, research and development.” (citations 
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Beebe cautions that efforts to use copyright protection to increase the 
aesthetic quality of copyrighted expression is not only inconsistent 
with the intent of the Framers,93 but also likely futile, ignoring 
differences between disciplines of knowledge and art.94 Scholars also 
disagree over whether progress is naturally promoted by incentivizing 
and rewarding creation,95 or whether progress instead requires favoring 
privileges for the use and reuse of copyrighted works and 
patented inventions.96 
D. Resolving Definitional Disputes 
Professor Solum anticipates that in some cases, the tools of 
immersion, examination of the constitutional record, and corpus 
linguistic analysis will lead to consilience. For example, in his essay, 
Professor Solum provides a first cut analysis of collocates of science 
from 1810 forward, using COHA,97 which suggest that science as used 
in the Copyright and Patent Clause is a category that encompasses 
more branches of knowledge than STEM disciplines. There is 
widespread agreement on this point. The Supreme Court has so 
 
omitted)). But see Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote?, supra note 18, at 803 (“[L]ate 
eighteenth century speakers of English more commonly used ‘improvement,’ ‘perfection,’ or 
‘advancement’ (as opposed to ‘progress’) when referring to the betterment of mankind’s 
knowledge base.”). 
 93.  Barton Beebe, Bleistein, The Problem of Aesthetic Progress, and the Making of 
American Copyright Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 338 (2017) (concluding from the drafting 
evidence that the decision of the Framers to exclude “fine arts from the language of the Progress 
Clause appears to have been a deliberate act”); see also id. at 340. 
 94.  Id. at 341–42. 
 95.  Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the 
Scope of Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 891 
(1990) (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)) 
(“Copyright promotes progress by acting as an incentive to authors to create new works and 
ultimately placing those works in the hands of the public.”); see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, 
Governmental Use of Copyrighted Property: The Sovereign’s Prerogative, 67 TEX. L. REV. 685, 730 
(1989) (“[T]hose rewards are essential to effectuating copyright law’s major objective of 
enhancing societal progress, because an absence of monetary protections might well result in 
diminished creativity.”). 
 96.  Jessica Litman, Readers’ Copyright, 58 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 325, 350 (2010) 
(“[C]opyright’s purpose is (and should be) to encourage reading, listening, and viewing” both 
by “creative remixers” and “passive consumers.”); see also id. at 339 (“But a moment’s reflection 
should reveal that a copyright system with no readers, listeners or viewers to enjoy the 
copyrighted works that the system produces has no plausible mechanism for promoting the 
progress of anything.”). 
 97. Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1646. 
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stated,98 and scholars who immerse themselves in key texts have 
reached a similar conclusion.99 There is little reason to suspect that 
analysis using the forthcoming Corpus of the Founding Era American 
English (COFEA), a corpus containing texts contemporaneous with 
the drafting and ratification era, will provide evidence of use that leads 
to a different interpretation of science. 
Where immersion and the constitutional record cut in different 
directions or are susceptible to multiple readings, as discussed in the 
examples above, corpus linguistic evidence of usage may allow a 
scholar to triangulate the original public meaning with a higher level 
of confidence. To date, computer-assisted linguistic analysis of the 
meaning of progress using a large corpus of texts contemporaneous 
with the framing of the Constitution has not been conducted.100 
Linguistic analysis using a corpus like COFEA may well aid courts in 
resolving disputes about its proper construction. Recent Supreme 
Court precedent indicates the continued importance of proper 
construction. While the Supreme Court has heretofore resisted calls 
to apply heightened scrutiny to congressional copyright statutes 
grounded either in the First Amendment or the Progress language, 
the Court signaled that a decision by Congress to tamper with a 
“traditional contour”101 of copyright law like the idea/expression 
divide or fair use might trigger heightened scrutiny.102 Determining 
whether congressional activity falls outside the scope of its authority 
in those areas may well turn in part on the proper definition of progress. 
For example, if the most common public meaning of progress is spread 
 
 98.  Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 324 (2012) (“Perhaps counterintuitively for the 
contemporary reader, Congress’ copyright authority is tied to the progress of science; its patent 
authority, to the progress of the useful arts.”). 
 99.  Beebe, supra note 93, at 323 (concluding that science, as distinguished from useful 
arts, “refer[s] to systematic theoretical and empirical knowledge,” but “neither category 
encompassed the fine arts”). 
 100.  But see supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 101.  These traditional contours work like buffers between the First Amendment and 
copyright protection. See, e.g., Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 485, 527 (2004). 
 102.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (“[W]hen, as in this case, Congress 
has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment 
scrutiny is unnecessary.”). But see id. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“We cannot avoid the need 
to examine the statute carefully by saying that ‘Congress has not altered the traditional contours 
of copyright protection,’ for the sentence points to the question, rather than the answer. Nor 
should we avoid that examination here.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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or distribution, courts should construe fair use and the idea-expression 
line consistent with that interpretation,103 which will generally mean a 
broader fair use exception to copyright protection, and more elements 
of a work falling on the unprotected idea side of the line. 
IV. USING CORPUS LINGUISTICS TO DISCOVER MODULATION 
In his article, Professor Solum cautions that modulation—an 
attempt to use old words in new ways—might go unrecognized by 
corpus lexicography.104 Corpus analysis should reveal commonly used 
meanings, but the meanings revealed will necessarily work in many 
contexts. To that extent, those meanings are acontextual. On the 
other hand, by definition, modulation deviates from established 
meaning. Corpus lexicography reveals the ways a word is typically 
used, but it will not disclose whether a given usage is an attempted 
modulation, whereby the user requires an existing term to bear new 
meaning in a specific context. An approach focused on uncovering 
ordinary public meaning will thus normally fail to catch a modulation 
in meaning. 
Context can help reveal modulation in some cases. For example, 
Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution gives the President 
the power to “fill up all Vacancies” in appointed offices “during the 
Recess of the Senate.”105 Professor Solum notes that the term recess 
read acontextually and in accordance with its ordinary public meaning 
could indicate any break in activity.106 Thus, the Recess Appointments 
Clause could be read to allow the President to fill a vacancy and 
appoint officers of the United States during any break of Senate 
 
 103.  See, e.g., Michael D. Murray, Reconstructing the Contours of the Copyright Originality 
and Idea-Expression Doctrines Regarding the Right to Deny Access to Works, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 
921, 930 (2014) (“The design of the contours of copyright relies on the policy of access to 
information in the arts and sciences. If access is denied or cut-off, or made practically inaccessible 
through onerous barriers, then the primary purpose of the copyright scheme is unfulfilled.”). 
 104.  Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1648; see also Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s 
Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 46 (2002) 
[hereinafter Solum, Congress’s Power] (“Evidence that the primary or most frequent usage of 
‘progress’ in the founding era was spatial or geographic does not answer the question as to 
whether that was the use made by those who framed or ratified the constitution.”). 
 105.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire 
at the End of their next Session.”). 
 106.  Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1637. 
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business, even a lunch break.107 However, in context, recess most likely 
refers to a sustained break in the regular business of the Senate, which 
would necessitate the President filling vacancies without the advice 
and consent of the Senate.108 This modulated use of recess is easy to 
detect. But one might reasonably worry that other key constitutional 
terms are modulated uses that could be more difficult to detect. 
Evidence of regular usage that predates or is contemporaneous could 
reasonably fail to reflect the novel use. 
However, corpus lexicography might also allow one to see clearly 
how the usage of key terms change after an inflection event like the 
passage of the Constitution. Consider some recent modulations in 
American English that have become ordinary, acontextual meanings. 
The term sandy has modulated to add a new meaning, referring to the 
hurricane that hit the Eastern seaboard of the United States in 
October 2012.109 Computational linguists posit that this sort of 
semantic shift can be detected in one of three ways. First, a spike in 
the frequency of word usage could signal meaningful change. For 
example, an increase in references to Sandy during coverage of and 
discussion about Hurricane Sandy as tracked by Google Trends 
presaged a new ordinary meaning.110 Second, semantic shift often 
occurs through a change in syntax when an existing word begins to be 
used as a new part of speech. For instance, apple is a noun describing 
a fruit, but it shifted around 1984 to add a proper noun sense as the 
public became more aware of and more interested in Apple 
computers.111 Finally, collocation data can indicate a shift in the 
meaning of a term as it begins to appear in new contexts. For example, 
in 1900, the term gay frequently appeared with words like dapper and 
courteous, but by 1990, the term frequently occupied the same 
semantic space as homosexual and transgender.112 
It is also possible that semantic shift could closely follow the 
ratification of the Constitution. The drafting and ratification of the 
 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 
(2014) (interpreting the Recess Appointments Clause and “put[ting] significant weight upon 
historical practice”). 
 109.  See Vivek Kulkarni et al., Statistically Significant Detection of Linguistic Change, in 
WWW ’15 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 24TH INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB 625, 626 (2015). 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 627. 
 112.  Id. at 625. 
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Constitution was a critical inflection point in American history. Such 
an event might create linguistic ripples. One might therefore detect 
post-ratification changes in ordinary meanings for key terms used in 
the Constitution. Founding era corpora could be analyzed for similar 
changes in frequency, syntax, and context to identify whether there is 
a post-ratification shift in meaning. 
For example, corpus linguistic data might be mined to track 
changes in the use of progress, especially as the use collocates with 
terms like science and art. Such a shift might reasonably be attributed 
to post-ratification usage. Post-ratification usage may not only reflect 
increased collocation between those terms but also modulation in 
meaning over time, proceeding from ratification. Indeed, in her 
analysis of the usage of progress in the Pennsylvania Gazette, Professor 
Pollack notes that some uses of progress that post-date ratification 
embodying the idea of progress as qualitative improvement might “be 
unreflective echoes of the constitutional phrase.”113 Those might also 
reflect a modulation—meaning acquired precisely because of the 
ratification event. Further examination of corpora that can be mined 
chronologically may reveal additional evidence that supports or refutes 
such a shift.  
V. LIMITATIONS OF CORPUS LINGUISTICS 
Corpus lexicography done well should provide better evidence of 
original meaning than an appeal to a dictionary alone.114 But as 
Professor Solum concludes, corpus lexicography cannot replace study 
of the constitutional record or immersion. As the discussion of 
modulation reveals,115 corpus lexicography is not well suited to catch 
attempted unconventional uses, although it may be used to show the 
effect of a modulation that has become an ordinary meaning. More 
generally, corpus lexicography, like textual immersion, might 
sometimes be maladapted to uncover meaning that matters. As 
Professor Solum cautions, textual immersion might likewise misfire if 
the corpus of texts selected are inadequate to reflect usage across a 
 
 113. Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote, supra note 18, at 801. 
 114. Solum, Triangulating, supra note 2, at 1668, 1670. 
 115. See id. at 1650–51. 
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broad swath of the public.116 He thus concludes corpus lexicography 
may provide better evidence of ordinary meaning, in part because one 
can sample from a much larger body of literature using computing 
technology, including selecting texts from the appropriate 
subculture.117 A search for original public meaning permits a level of 
agnosticism regarding which texts may or must be included in a 
corpus. If every text is equally likely to reveal public meaning through 
usage by ordinary speakers (in the case of transcripts) and writers, then 
any text can be included in the corpus. But a poorly constructed 
corpus can be both voluminous and unrepresentative. For example, 
corpus linguists note the importance of a variety of sources if a corpus 
is to provide generalizable findings.118 
The use of corpus lexicography to conduct an originalist inquiry 
also may mistakenly presume the answer to an important question that 
Professor Solum posed in earlier work anticipating the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft119 some fifteen years ago. Leaving 
aside attempted modulation, can we assume the Framers intended to 
adopt the most frequently used meaning, or that the Ratifiers were 
ratifying that meaning?120 A search for ordinary public meaning 
embraces that simplifying assumption. To the extent that assumption 
is misguided, corpus lexicography data might not only be misapplied 
but actually impede the correct interpretation and construction of 
constitutional language.121 
 
 116. Id. at 1667. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Douglas Biber, Representativeness in Corpus Design, 8 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC 
COMPUTING 243, 243 (1993) (“[I]f a corpus does not represent the range of text types in a 
population, it will not represent the range of linguistic distributions”); Geoffrey Leech, Corpora 
and Theories of Linguistic Performance, in DIRECTIONS IN CORPUS LINGUISTICS: PROCEEDINGS 
OF NOBEL SYMPOSIUM 82, at 105, 112–13 (Jan Svartvik ed., 1992). 
 119.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 120. Solum, Congress’s Power, supra note 104, at 46 (“Evidence that the primary or most 
frequent usage of ‘progress’ in the founding era was spatial or geographic does not answer the 
question as to whether that was the use made by those who framed or ratified the constitution.”). 
 121. Using inapplicable but easily accessible data can contribute to behavior based on bad 
information, triggering a “streetlight” effect, named after the famous (and likely apocryphal) 
story about a drunk looking on 3rd Street for keys he lost on 1st Street because the light is better 
on 3rd. See Karen M. Gebbia, Circuit Splits and Empiricism in the Supreme Court, 36 PACE L. 
REV. 477, 556 (2016); David H. Freedman, Why Scientific Studies Are So Often Wrong: The 
Streetlight Effect, DISCOVER, July–Aug. 2010, http://discovermagazine.com/2010/jul-
aug/29-why-scientific-studies-often-wrong-streetlight-effect. 
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In the end, if corpus lexicography is to improve originalist analysis, 
its use must effectively constrain judicial discretion. But analysis even 
from a balanced, representative corpus can still yield biased results if 
the analyst consciously or unconsciously biases the search.122 It would 
be erroneous to make too much of this concern; originalism itself is 
an imperfect constraint.123 As with originalism, imperfections in corpus 
data mining do not invalidate its use.124 
Despite these limitations, corpus lexicography has much to offer 
for deciphering original public meaning. Evidence of usage may 
confirm or challenge interpretation based on textual immersion and 
constitutional history. Consilience between those methods may 
liquidate ambiguity and thus harmonize disputed interpretations.125 In 
addition, corpus analysis may prove useful in identifying modulations 
that become standard meanings. 
  
 
 122.  Dominic Stewart, Safeguarding the Lexicogrammatical Environment: Translating 
Semantic Prosody, in CORPUS USE AND TRANSLATING: CORPUS USE FOR LEARNING TO 
TRANSLATE AND LEARNING CORPUS USE TO TRANSLATE 29, 41–42 (Allison Beeby, Patricia 
Rodríguez Inés & Pilar Sánchez-Gijón eds., 2009) (arguing that it can be difficult to cabin the 
analyst’s personal insights and prevent bias in the results). 
 123.  William Baude, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (positing that originalism cannot perfectly constrain judges, but may serve 
as a helpful tool for judges who seek to constrain themselves). 
 124. Sue Atkins et al., Corpus Design Criteria, 7 LITERARY & LINGUISTIC COMPUTING 1, 
6 (1992) (“It would be short-sighted indeed to wait until one can scientifically balance a corpus 
before starting to use one, and hasty to dismiss the results of corpus analysis as ‘unreliable’ or 
‘irrelevant’ because the corpus used cannot be proved to be ‘balanced.’”). 
 125.  Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison) (explaining the Constitution would 
be “obscure and equivocal, until [its] meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of 
particular discussions and adjudications”). 
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